Trusts-Apportionment of Stock Dividends-Principal and Income by unknown
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 14
12-1935
Trusts-Apportionment of Stock Dividends-
Principal and Income
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
(1935) "Trusts-Apportionment of Stock Dividends-Principal and Income," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 11: Iss. 2, Article 14.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol11/iss2/14
RECENT CASE NOTES
who is tardy in recording his instrument only the remedy of proving
absence of good faith or of consideration on the part of the one who
has first filed his deed, mortgage or lease.
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Mishawaka, St. Joseph Loan
& Trust Company v. Neu, one presenting a deed, mortgage or lease for
recording, must at his peril know the rights of anyone then in open
and notorious possession of the real estate involved and his failure
to ascertain and know the same could be used as proof of his lack of
"good faith" in an action to enforce his rights by the one in possession.
In this case, a casual inspection of the premises by the mortgagee four
days before the execution of the mortgage was deemed by the Supreme
Court sufficient evidence of "good faith" on the part of the mortgagee
in the absence of proof of its actual knowledge of any rights or inter-
est in the property by plaintiffs who had contracted to purchase the
property of the mortgagor, paid part of the purchase price and had
moved into the premises two days before the mortgage was signed and
was in open and notorious possession thereof when the mortgage was
executed and recorded.
If the decision in this case remains the law of this state, it will
simplify the questions involved in taking title to, or an interest in, real
estate. The one acquiring the same need look only to the record in
the absence of actual notice to him that there is one in possession of
the same who may claim rights or interests therein contrary to his.
But the plaintiffs in this case, who had to act without the benefit of
the Supreme Court's decision therein, doubtless feel that although they
acted under the law as it was, their case was decided under the law
as the court thought it should be. Transitions are seldom made with-
out injury to someone.
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TRUSTS--APPORTIONMENT OF STocK DIVIDENDS-PRINCIPAL AND INCOME.&-
This was a suit by the life beneficiary of a trust to get such an interpretation
of the trust agreement as would compel the trustee to treat stock dividends
received upon shares held in the trust as income to go to such life bene-
ficiary. The trustee had, in the absence of any specific expression of the
settlor's in respect to stock dividends, treated such dividends as principal
belonging to the corpus of the trust. Held, that stock dividends received upon
shares held in trust are principal and not income distributable among life
beneficiaries. 1 This question had never before been passed upon by the
Indiana courts.
In determining who is entitled to a stock dividend upon shares held in
trust, as between the life tenant and remainderman, it is generally held that
the intent of the settlor must govern, if sufficiently indicated in the trust
instrument and not contrary to a statute or rule of policy. 2 When, however,
1 Powell et al. v. Madison Safe Deposit & Trust Co. et al. (1935), 196
N. E. 324.
2 Gibbons v. Mahon (1890), 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup. Ct. 1057; In re Robin-
son's Trust (1907), 218 Pa. St. 481, 67 At. 775.
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there is no evidence of the settlor's intent, courts have reached various
results in determining whether the stock dividend should be treated as income
to go to the life tenant, or as principal to go to the remainderman.
The problem was first presented in England, where, prior to 1887, all
unusual or extraordinary dividends were held to be capital, whether in the
form of cash or stock, and were given to the remainderman exclusively. 3
The later English rule, laid down in Bouche ,v. Sproule4 in 1887, resembles
very closely the Massachusetts rule (infra) in that the intent and purpose of
the corporation in the individual instance is controlling as to whether the
dividend shall be called income or capital. In that case the court held that
as regards corporations which had the power of either distributing their
profits as dividends or of converting them into capital, the intention of the
corporation in declaring the dividend was decisive as to whether it should
be considered income or capital in a trust. As this rule controls in England
today5 great importance attaches to the intention and purpose expressed by
the directors for the declaration of the dividend, as this is the basis upon which
apportionments are made by the courts between capital and income.
In the United States the problem came before the Massachusetts court in
the early case of Minot v. Paine6 and the so-called "Massachusetts rule" was de-
veloped as a solution. The rule, as simply stated by the court in that case, is
"to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends,
however made, as capital." The court expressly acknowledged the rule to be
one of expediency rather than one which scientifically apportioned the divi-
dends according to the time they were earned. This rule was adopted by the
Indiana court in the instant case. After reviewing the Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania rules, the court stated "This is the Massachusetts rule, which
we feel to be sound in principal, and which has the advantage of simplicity
in operation. We therefore adopt it."7
3 Brander v. Brander (1799), 4 Ves. Jr. 185, 31 Eng. Repr. 815; Paris v.
Paris (1204), 10 Ves. Jr. 185, 32 Eng. Repr. 815; Irving v. Houston, 4 Paton
(Scot.) 921; Witts v. Steere (1807), 13 Ves. Jr. 363, 33 Eng. Repr. 330;
Clayton v. Gresham (1804), 10 Ves. Jr. 288, 32 Eng. Repr. 855.
4 L. R. 12 App. Cases 397, 57 L. T. (N. S.) 345.
5 Bouche v. Sproule (1887), L. R. 12 App. Cases 397; Jones v. Evans
(1913), 1 Ch. Div. 23; Re Alsbury (1890), L. R. Ch. Div. 237; Re Hatton
(1917), 1 Ch. Div. 357.
6 (1868), 99 Mass. 101.
7 Other courts following the Massachusetts rule are Supreme Court of
United States-Gibbons v. Mahon (1890), 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup. Ct. 1057.
Connecticut-Mills v. Britton (1894), 64 Conn. 4, 29 At. 231.
District of Columbia-Lanston v. Lanston (1923), 290 Fed. 315.
Illinois-DeKoven v. Alson (1903), 205 Ill. 309, 68 N. E. 930.
Maine-Thatcher v. Thatcher (1918), 117 Me. 331, 104 Ad. 515.
Michigan-In re Joy's Estate (1929), 247 Mich. 418, 225 N. W. 878.
Missouri-Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co. (1927), 317 Mo. 1028, 298
S. W. 91.
Nebraska-United States Trust Co. v. Cowin (1931), 121 Nebr. 427, 237
N. W. 284.
Ohio-Lamb v. Lehman (1924), 110 Ohio St. 59, 143 N. E. 276.
Rhode Island-Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Tucker (1931), 51
1. I. 507, 155 At. 661.
Virginia-Kauffman v. Charlottesville Woolen Mills Co. (1896), 93 Va.
673, 25 S. E. 1003.
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This rule does not apply to cash dividends made by a corporation when
the dividends are in fact a distribution from funds obtained by a sale of
permanent capital or physical assets,8 nor does it include dividends which
represent an increment of capital assets from a source other than earnings,9
the dividends in both these instances going to the corpus as principal. Neither
does the rule apply when the stock distributed among the stockholders is that
of another corporation purchased with funds earned during the tenancy,1O
nor when a corporation declares a cash dividend from earnings and votes
an increase of the capital stock to a like amount on the same day, the owners
of the shares having the option of taking the cash or using the dividend
to pay for the newly voted stock.11 In both of these instances the dividend
was held to be income to go to the life beneficiary.
Another solution was reached by the Kentucky courts in 1892 when in
Hite u. Hire12 the rule was laid down that as between a life beneficiary in
corporate stock and the remainderman, a stock dividend will be treated as
income if it in fact represents a profit earned by the corporation. Under the
rule thus laid down, all dividends, ordinary and extraordinary, stock and
cash, are considered income to go to the life cestui if they in fact represent a
distribution of earnings, no matter when such earnings were accumulated.13
This rule is now followed by a small minority.14
The Pennsylvania courts treated the question in a still different manner
when in Earp's Appeal15 the court decided that the life tenant was entitled
to such portion of the income of the corporation as was earned and dis-
tributed during his term, whether in the form of cash or stock dividends.
West Virginia-Security Trust Co. v. Rammelsburg (1918), 82 W. Va.
701, 97 S. E. 122.
Statutes of Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. 1930, § 4966), Georgia (Ga. Civil
Code 1926, § 3667), New York (Laws 1926, c. 843), and Oregon (Ore. Laws
1931, c. 371, § 5) have adopted rules for dividend distribution substantially
like the Massachusetts rule.
8 Heard v. Eldredge (1872), 109 Mass. 258 (a dividend declared by a
corporation from money received for property condemned by eminent domain
proceedings).
9 Gilkey v. Paine (1888), 80 Me. 319, 14 At. 205 (distribution of shares
purchased with proceeds of bond issue considered capital).
10 Grey v. Hemenway (1912), 212 Mass. 239, 98 N. E. 789; Smith v.
Cotting (1918), 231 Mass. 42, 120 N. E. 177; United States v. Phellis (1921),
275 U. S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63.
11 Hyde v. Holmes (1908), 198 Mass. 287, 84 N. E. 318.
1293 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778.
13 Cox v. Gaulbert (1907), 148 Ky. 407, 147 S. W. 25; Goff v. Evans
(1927), 217 Ky. 664, 290 S. W. 490; Lightfoot v. Beard (1929), 230 Ky. 488,
20 S. W. (2nd) 90.
14 Bryan v. Aikin (1913), 10 Del. Ch. 446, 86 At. 674; DuPont v. Peyton
(1927), 15 Del. Ch. 255, 136 Atl. 149; Lightfoot v. Beard (supra); Goff v.
Evans (supra).
15 (1857), 28 Pa. 368.
16Pritchett v. Nashville Traction Co. (1896), 96 Tenn. 472, 36 S. W.
1064; in In re Dutfill's Estate (1919), 180 Cal. 748, 183 Pac. 337, the court
said: "The determination of the directors of a corporation as to the source
of its dividends has no persuasive effect upon the court when it is required
to decide whether a stock dividend constitutes income which goes to the
tenant for lie or for years, or principal to be held for the benefit of the
remainderman.'
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Courts following this decision have bound themselves to go behind the form
of the dividend and ascertain just when the profits out of which it was
declared were earned by the corporation.' 6  "The effect of this rule is to
give to the life tenant the income which has been earned since the trust came
into being, but, at the same time, to preserve the value of the corpus as it
was at the date of the death of the testator, or to use a more convenient term,
to preserve the intact value of the estate."1 7 The intact value is found by
dividing the corporation's capital and surplus at the time when the trust
begins to hold the stock by the total number of shares outstanding at the time,
and multiplying the result by the number of shares held in the trust.18 This
rule has a substantial following.' 9
The Kentucky rule is the most vulnerable of the three doctrines. It has
the advantage of simplicity of administration, but this is more than counter-
balanced by its tendency to favor the life cestui at the expense of the remain-
derman, who, getting no portion of any dividend, ordinary or extraordinary,
may be forced to accept a corpus in which the total value of the stock holdings
in a particular corporation has been diminished by the awarding of stock
and other extraordinary dividends to the life cestui. Too much emphasis is
placed upon expediency with a corresponding sacrifice in accuracy of distribu-
tion.
If the Pennsylvania rule is applied, however, the pendulum swings to the
opposite extreme, expediency of administration being sacrificed to gain a
precise apportionment of each extraordinary dividend between capital and
income. In making the apportionment, the value of the corpus must remain
unimpaired, and an inquiry must be made to ascertain the value of the stock
in the corpus as of the date of acquisition, the rule contemplating that only
that portion of the stock dividend which was declared against earnings
accumulated since the acquisition shall be classified as income.20 A difficulty
at once presents itself. If the stock represents shares in one of our modern
industrial empires, will not the task of determining what portion of the stock
17Re Nirdlinger's Estate (1927), 290 Pa. 457, 139 At. 200. In Stokes'
Estate (1913), 240 Pa. 277, 87 Atl. 971, a corporation declared a $5.00 dividend
upon stock of which the corpus had 171 shares. At date of testator's death the
corporation had a capital stock of $60,008,000 and an accumulated surplus of
$27,219,779. After his death an additional $3,110,868 was earned and added
to the surplus. The amount of the dividend was 10% of the capital stock and
amounted to $6,060,800. The court held that the lower court erred in awarding
the live tenants only 3,110,868/30,330,647ths of the dividend, holding that it
should have awarded the life interest 3,110,868/6,060,OOths of the $855 dividend
going to the trust.
18 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees (1935), sec. 848, p. 2456.
10 California-In re Duffil's Estate (1919), 180 Cal. 748, 183 Pac. 337.
Maryland-Thomas v. Gregg (1894), 78 Md. 545, 28 Atl. 565.
New Hampshire-Holbrook v. Holbrook (1907), 74 N. H. 201, 66 Atl. 124.
New Jersey-Van Doren v. Olden (1868), 19 N. J. Eq. 176, 97 Am. Dec. 650.
Iowa-Kalbach v. Clark (1907), 133 Iowa 215, 110 N. W. 599.
Pennsylvania-Earp's Appeal (1857), 28 Pa. 368.
South Carolina-Wallace v. Wallace (1911), 90 S. C. 61, 72 S. E. 553.
Tennessee-Pritchett v. Nashville Trust Co. (1896), 96 Tenn. 72, 36 S. W.
1064.
Vermont-In re Heaton's Estate (1915), 89 Vt. 550, 96 Atl. 21.
Wisconsin-Soehnlein v. Soehnlein (1911), 146 Wis. 330, 131 N. W. 739.
20 Re Sloan's Estate (1922), 258 Pa. 368, 102 Atl. 31.
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dividend was declared against earnings accumulated since the trust obtained
the shares be too costly to be practical? As the corporate balance sheet is
only prima facie evidence of the value of the corporate assets, the trustee
may be compelled to go behind these primary figures given by the corporation
and determine the true condition. If the stock has been in the trust for a
number of years and the corporation has handled millions of dollars in the
interim, the expense and time required for the search would be great. If but
a few shares were held by the trust, might not the expense of such an investi-
gation easily eat up the entire dividend? And even after such an investiga-
tion by the trustee it is possible that the life cestui or remainderman will
demand an adjudication of the apportionment with the consequent delay and
expense attendant upon such litigation.
Nor are the courts agreed upon the basis that should be used to ascertain
the intact value of the stock. The Pennsylvania decisions amply reflect the
confusion existing upon this point, the court that originated the rule holding at
different times that to determine the extent of the reduction in value of the
shares in the corpus occasioned by a declaration of stock dividends (1) the
market value of the stock at date of creation of the trust should be compared
with the market value at date of such stock dividend, 2 1 (2) actual assets of
the corporation should be compared, 2 2 (3) the par value of stock plus surplus
should be compared,2 3 (4) actual values and not book values should be com-
pared, 2 4 (5) liquidating values of the stock should be compared, 2 5 and
(6) that "going concern value" must be given full weight, the court adding
that "under all situations that arise only the intact value is to be considered."2 0
Another criticism of the Pennsylvania rule is that in applying it trustees
are prone to overlook the fact that an increase in the book value of shares
of stock may represent not an accumulation of earnings, but a write-up of
corporate assets occasioned by a rise in the value of land or stock owned
by the corporation, which increase generally goes to the corpus as capital.
If an apportionment were made on the basis of book value in such a case the
life cestui would benefit at the expense of the remainderman.
The Pennsylvania court in In re Stokes' Estate2 7 seemed to evince a desire
for a change in the rule of that state, but later the rule was reaffirmed by
the court and the same doctrine applied to stock rights2 8 and profits from
the sale of corporate stock held in trust.2 9 It will be observed that New York,
whose courts have followed both the Kentucky3O and Pennsylvaniasl rules,
adopted the Massachusetts rule by statute in 1926.32
21 Earp's Appeal (1857), 28 Pa. 368.
22 Smith's Appeal (1891), 140 Pa. 344, 21 At. 438.
23 Stokes' Estate (1913), 240 Pa. 288, 87 At. 975.
24 Thompson's Estate (1918), 262 Pa. 278, 105 At. 273.
25 Dickinson's Estate (1926), 285 Pa. 449, 132 At. 352.
26 Jones v. Integrity Trust Co. (1928), 292 Pa. 149, 140 Atl. 862.
27 (1913), 240 Pa. 288, 87 At. 975. The court here, after referring to and
stating the Massachusetts rule, said: "If such rule is desired in Pennsylvania,
we think the change should be made by the legislature rather than by the
courts."
28 Jones v. Integrity Trust Co. (1920), 292 Pa. 149, 140 At. 862.
29 In re Nirdlinger's Estate (1927), 290 Pa. 457, 139 At. 200.
3 0 In re Kernochan (1887), 104 N. Y. 618, 11 N. E. 149.
31 In re Osborne (1913), 209 N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723.
32 Laws 1926, chap. 843.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
In application the Massachusetss rule strikes a medium between the Ken-
tucky and Pennsylvania rules. Like the Kentucky rule it is arbitrary in
determining the rights of the life cestui and remainderman, and it is like
the Pennsylvania rule in that it makes a rough attempt at apportioning the
extraordinary dividends by giving all cash dividends, ordinary and extra-
ordinary,3 3 to the life cestui and allotting all stock dividends to the corpus.
This rule of thumb apportionment is the main point of attack for critics of the
rule, who point out that in the individual case an inequitable distribution
might result from the use of such an arbitrary method. This is a valid
objection and it must be balanced against the possible uncertainty and im-
practicability of applying the theoretically perfect Pennsylvania rule.3 4 It is
true that in application the Massachusetts rule has a tendency to favor the
remainderman at the expense of the life cestui in that some portion of the
corporate assets capitalized by the stock dividend were probably earned after
the trust acquired the stock, but it must also be considered that the Pennsyl-
vania rule might easily do an injustice to the remainderman by throwing on
him the burden of proving that part of the stock dividend represents capital
and making him bear the expense of searching the corporate records to prove
his contention. 3 5
The most persuasive argument in favor of the Massachusetts rule is its
ease and certainty of application. As it necessitates no detailed examination
of the corporate records it is much less difficult and expensive in operation
than the more precise Pennsylvania rule, and it also avoids the uncertainty
generally attendant upon its use.3 6  While it is true that equity should not
be denied because of difficulty in ascertaining the respective rights of the life
cestui and remainderman, it is equally true that uncertainty as to just what
33 Except as modified by footnotes 8, 9, 10, and 11.
34 Some supporters of the Massachusetts rule hold that the remainderman
has a logical claim to stock dividends, arguing that as the accumulated earnings
capitalized by a stock dividend belong to the corpus before the dividend is
declared and stock issued against them, the stock dividend should go to the
corpus, as the distribution of the stock does not effect an actual distribution
of corporate assets but only dilutes the equity in the corporation represented
by each individual share. Their argument, however, overlooks the fact that
part or all of the earnings so capitalized might represent profits made since
the trust acquired the stock and hence be income to go to the life cestui
according to the terms of the trust instruments.
35 In Nirdlinger's Estate (supra), the court stated that "An extraordinary
dividend paid out of accumulated earnings presumptively belongs to the life
tenant, but it is shown that the distribution impairs the intact value of the
estate, the court will make an apportionment," and in Boyer's Appeal (1909),
224 Pa. 144, 73 At. 320, the court held that "As every dividend presumptively
goes to the life tenant, the burden is on the remainderman to show any
impairment of principal."
36 The uncertainty as to what the final apportionment may be is exempli-
fied by Jones v. Integrity Trust Co. (supra), where the court said: "The
question involved in this case is: How shall certain stock, received by the
defendant trust estate as the result of an extra-ordinary stock dividend of
25 per cent be divided between the corpus of the trust and the life tenant
who is entitled to the income thereof? To this, the court below, appellant,
and appellee, have each given a different answer. It is certain, therefore, that
two of them must be wrong; in reality all three are." Apparently there is
no basis upon which to predict what will be the finally adjudicated rights of
the parties when the Pennsylvania rule is invoked.
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these rights are can be a cause of great inequity and should consequently be
avoided when possible.
The U. S. Supreme Court has substantiated the Massachusetts rule by hold-
ing that "stock dividends representing merely surplus profits transferred to
the capital account are not taxable to the shareholders as income within the
meaning of the Income Tax Law of 1913."37 The Uniform Principal and
Income Act has also adopted the Massachusetts rule.3 8
The American Law Institute in its restatement of the Law of Trusts has
adopted the Pennsylvania rule, stating that "extraordinary dividends declared
during the period, whether in cash or in shares of the corporation or in other
property, are income to the extent and only to the extent that they are declared
out of earnings of the corporation which accrued subsequent to the creation
of the trust or the acquisition of the shares by the trustee."39 Bogert, however,
in his recent work "Trusts and Trustees" states that "It is believed that the
trend of recent opinion has been that the Massachusetts rule is the more
desirable doctrine" and takes the position that from a practical point of view
the Massachusetts rule is the best of the three rules followed today.4O The
fact that recent decisions in states where the question has come up for the
first time have expressly adopted the Massachusetts rule 4 l seems to support
his contention. M. E. W.
CONTRACTS-ENFORCEMENT OF NEGATIVE COVENANTS BY INJUNcTION.-De-
fendant, upon entering employment of plaintiff as head salesman and branch
manager, covenanted that he would not during the employment nor within
eighteen months thereafter, engage in the business of selling merchandise
handled by the plaintiff, either directly or indirectly, for himself or for others
in any territory in which he had worked. After working for more than three
years, the employment was terminated and a month later the defendant began
selling merchandise of the type described in the contract. Plaintiff brought
suit asking an injunction against the defendant restraining him from soliciting
or diverting plaintiff's patronage. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to
plaintiff's complaint, the plaintiff appeals. Held, under the facts stated, the
restraint would not be unreasonable or against public policy and the demurrer
of the defendant should have been overruled. Reversed. 1
Express negative covenants which restrict one person from competing with
another or from accepting employment with a competitor, may be analyzed
from the viewpoint of the subject-matter of the contract of which the covenants
are a part. The division according to this classification would be:
(1) Covenants pertaining to or included in contracts of employment.
(a) Covenants not to compete during the term of the employment.
(b) Covenants not to compete after the termination of the employment.
(2) Covenants not to compete which are ancillary to the sale of a business or
profession and its good will.
37Towne v. Eisner (1917), 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158; Eisner v.
Macomber (1920), 252 U. S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189.
38 Oregon Laws (1931), chap. 371, sec. 5.
39 Sec. 236, subhec. (b), p. 492. 40 Sec. 857, p. 2483.
41 In re Joy's Estate (1929), 247 Mich. 418, 225 N. W. 878; Hayes v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co. (1927), 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S. W. 91.
1 Grand Union Tea Co. v. Walker (1935), 195 N. E. 277 (Ind. Sup. Ct.).
